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Introduction
Business groups play an important role in many developed and developing countries. This corporate structure allows firms within these groups to reduce transaction costs, overcome market imperfections and increase performance by using economies of scale and scope (e.g., Alchian 1975 , Williamson 1975 , Chang and Choi 1988 , Stein 1997 , Khanna and Pelepu 2000 , Khanna 2000 , Morck et al. 2005 .
Business groups have a dark side as well (cf. Scharfstein and Stein 2000) . More specifically, recent studies have shown that investment of firms affiliated with business groups is less sensitive to cash flow than investment of firms outside of business groups (e.g., Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein 1991 , Ramirez 1995 , Perotti and Gelfer 2001 . However, available evidence on the sensitivity of investment to liquidity in developed countries is only available for Anglo-American and Japanese business models and, to the best of our knowledge, little is known about the sensitivity in the continental business model. In fact, Morck et al. (2005, p. 672) observe that the lack of results may be due to "the lack of empirical attempts using developed country data." This paper fills this gap and examines the investment sensitivity to cash flows in a unique, large sample of German firms. 1 Using the econometric framework developed in Bond et al. (2003) , we find that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is virtually identical for firms participating in business groups as well as firms outside of business groups. This suggests that the European continental business model is effective in overcoming imperfections in the financial market and that gains from participation in business groups should come from other sources.
1 Previous research on continental business model and its implications for investment are for the periods of early capitalism (e.g., Fohlin 1998, Becht and Ramirez 2003) . Audretsch and Elston (2002) , Behr (2005) , and Bond et al. (2003) analyze the sensitivity of investment to cash flow for more modern German firms. They, however, do not consider the effects of participating in business groups.
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Data
We use the Deutsche Bundesbank's database of income statements and balance sheets of German nonfinancial companies. (See Deutsche Bundesbank (1998) for a detailed description.) The number of firms included in the data varies from 50,000 to 70,000 per year and the available data span from 1988 to 2000. Although the sample of firms is not generally representative (the Bundesbank collects information only on firms applying for rediscount transactions), the coverage of the manufacturing sector is very high (see Deutsche Bundesbank 1998) . Hence, because we focus on manufacturing firms in the corporate sector, our sample is interesting and important from statistical and policy standpoints.
After dropping outliers and firms with incomplete records, our sample includes 8,260 firms and 74,174 observations. 2 Importantly, our data have a large portion of small-and medium-sized firms while previous exercises used data for listed companies that tend to be very large relative to non-listed firms. This aspect of the data is particularly important because most business groups include a large number of small unlisted entities, and the effect of participating in a business group is expected to be larger for small firms. 
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Since we do not have information about the value of firms, we use the econometric specifications motivated and developed in Bond et al. (2003) . In particular, we estimate the following regressions:
where i and t index firms and time, ( ) I K is investment to capital ratio, ( ) K Y is capital to output ratio, (CF K ) is cash flow to capital ratio, BG is a business group dummy equal to one if the firm is affiliated with a business group and zero otherwise, ΔlnY is the growth rate of sales, t ω and i λ are time and firm fixed effects, ε is the error term. 4 As discussed in Bond et al. (2003) , the errorcorrection specification (1) can be understood as an empirical generalization of the first order conditions for the optimal capital stock in a static factor demand model. On the other hand, the Euler specification (2) is based on explicit modeling of convex adjustment costs (Bond and Meghir 1991) .
The validity of these specifications is not mutually exclusive (see Bond et al. 2003) .
These specifications are similar in spirit to the specifications in Perotti and Gelfer (2001) and Hoshi et al. (1991) which also interact in the business group dummy with the cash flow. The coefficients γ 0 and γ 1 are of central interest. If business groups make affiliated firms less sensitive to a firm's own cash flow, then γ 0 and γ 1 should be negative. 5
We estimate specifications (1) and (2) by the system generalized method of moments (SYSGMM) developed in Arellano and Bover (1995) , Blundell and Bond (1998) and others to address potential 4 CF is measured as sales minus the cost of materials minus the wage bill minus operating taxes minus rental and leasing expenses minus interest and other operating expenses; I is defined as gross additions to tangible assets minus gross disposal of tangible assets; K is measured as the end of period balance sheet value of land, buildings, technical equipment and machines, other equipment and machines; Y is net sales. 5 One should be careful in giving structural interpretation of the estimates of β as these parameters may not reflect the relationship between liquidity constraints and investment sensitivity (e.g., Kaplan and Zingales 1997 Table 2 presents estimates of the error-correction specification (1). Consistent with previous evidence (Bond et al. 2003 , Behr 2005 , the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is small for German firms: Small-and medium-sized firms are more likely to have a large wedge between the internal and external costs of financing and, thus, the difference in investment sensitivity should be smaller for a small firm participating in Konzerns than for a small stand-alone firm. Using employment as a criterion, we divide our sample into three size classes -small (less than 100 employees), medium (between 100 and 500 employees), and large (more than 500 employees) -and report the estimates by size class in Tables 3 and 4 . In the error-correction specification (Table 3) , the sensitivity to cash flow is smaller for small Konzern firms than for their small stand-alone counterparts. There is little difference in the investment sensitivity for medium and large firms. In the Euler specification (Table   4) , there is no difference between Konzern and stand-alone firms for all size classes.
We find that the qualitative results do not change when we estimate (1) and (2) (1). Industry and year dummy variables and constant term are included but not reported. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Sargan is the SarganHansen test of overidentifying restrictions . AR(k) are the test statistics for the presence of k-th order serial correlation in the error term. The set of instruments for SYSGMM includes third to fifth lags of levels of predetermined variables for the difference moment conditions and second to fifth lags of differences of predetermined variables for the level moment conditions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Table reports estimates of specification (2). Industry and year dummy variables and constant term are included but not reported. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Sargan is the SarganHansen test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(k) are the test statistics for the presence of k-th order serial correlation in the error term. The set of instruments for SYSGMM includes third to fifth lags of levels of predetermined variables for the difference moment conditions and second to fifth lags of differences of predetermined variables for the level moment conditions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Note: Table reports estimates of specification (1). Industry and year dummy variables and constant term are included but not reported. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Sargan is the SarganHansen test of the overidentifying restrictions. AR(k) are the test statistics for the presence of k-th order serial correlation in the error term. The set of instruments for SYSGMM includes third to fifth lags of levels of predetermined variables for the difference moment conditions and second to fifth lags of differences of predetermined variables for the level moment conditions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Note: Table reports estimates of specification (2). Industry and year dummy variables and constant term are included but not reported. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Sargan is the SarganHansen test of overidentifying restrictions. AR(k) are the test statistics for the presence of k-th order serial correlation in the error term. The set of instruments for SYSGMM includes third to fifth lags of levels of predetermined variables for the difference moment conditions and second to fifth lags of differences of predetermined variables for the level moment conditions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Note: Table reports estimates of specification (1). Year dummy variables and constant term are included but not reported. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The set of instruments for SYSGMM includes third to fifth lags of levels of predetermined variables for the difference moment conditions and second to fifth lags of differences of predetermined variables for the level moment conditions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Note: Table reports estimates of specification (2). Year dummy variables and constant term are included but not reported. Asymptotic robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The set of instruments for SYSGMM includes third to fifth lags of levels of predetermined variables for the difference moment conditions and second to fifth lags of differences of predetermined variables for the level moment conditions. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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In summary, we do not find strong support for the hypothesis that investment sensitivity to financial constraints is higher for stand-alone firms than for firms inside business groups (provided that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is a good approximation of financial constraints; see Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) . Hence, the continental model might be more efficient than one for Anglo-American countries, because of the prevalence of bank financing rather than equity financing. With large banks occupying corporate boards and closely monitoring firms, these firms can afford to make investment decisions based on long-term perspectives rather than on short-term cash flows, regardless if they are part of a business group. In light of our findings, the gains from participating in a business group should probably lie not so much in overcoming imperfections of financial markets (i.e., in internalizing capital market) but in better contract enforcement, coordination, monitoring, diversification and tax optimization (e.g., Hulle 1998).
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Conclusion
Participation in business groups can attenuate information asymmetries and, thus, it can improve allocation of capital and reduce sensitivity of investment to cash flow. We find that firms do not benefit substantially from being a part of a business group in an economy with a continental business model. Specifically, the level of investment sensitivity in Germany is small and, hence, the reduction in the sensitivity that business groups can offer is small as well. Only small firms appear to have relatively small benefits from participation in business groups, while large and medium firms inside and outside business groups have the same sensitivity. The benefits of continental business groups may be in reducing other transaction costs by improving contract enforcement, coordination, and so on.
